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After the split share structure reform from 2005, a number of listed companies 
started to learn from the experiences of enterprises in developed countries, to motivate 
themselves to improve the performance by stock options granted to executives. 
Weather stock options compensation is to induce risk-taking and what kind of impact 
on the executives’ behavior, is becoming a hot topic within the subject.  
The objective of this study is to explore the effects of stock option compensation 
on firm risk-taking. The study experiments 120 China A share listing companies 
which have stock option granted to executives, collects data about the stock option 
compensation plan, then investigates the relationship between stock option 
compensation and firm’s risk-taking. Then, the study goes further to the effects which 
vesting conditions and stock-holding on the relationship between stock option 
compensation and risk-taking. 
The paper is organized as follows. The first chapter is to introduce the research 
background and contribution of this study. The second chapter is about the basic 
theory of Agency Problem and Human Capital and the optimal compensation contract 
and reviews of the prior literature .The third chapter is to develop the hypothesis. 
Then, describe the data and analyze empirical results. At last, conclude the paper and 
discuss the limitation and future research directions. In fact, this study does find some 
relationships between stock option compensation and risk-taking. Our evidence 
indicates stock option compensation can induce excessive risk taking, thus mitigate 
the agency problems. However, the effect of vesting conditions and stock-holding on 
the relationship is negative. Thus, the  study suggests that companies should 
strengthen stock option compensation in order to align the interests between 
executives and shareholders. 
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第 2 章 理论基础与文献综述 
2.1 理论基础 
2.1.1 最优契约理论 
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